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ABSTRACT 
Arbitration is an effective way to solve disputes, through which parties from different 
countries can be partially free from anyone’s local jurisdiction. However, the recognition and 
enforcement of international arbitration awards still rely on the national court system. Since 
China opened its door to the world, more and more commercial disputes have been settled 
through arbitration. However, many foreign investors and writers have complained about the 
defects in the recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards in China. This paper will look 
into the causes of these defects in, and try to find ways to resolve the defects. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration, the most formal and oldest method of Alternative Dispute Resolution1 in 
international commerce,2 has become the most popular method to resolve international 
commercial disputes since the mid-1980s3 Parties welcome arbitration mainly because it 
provides a certain degree of neutrality. Arbitration helps the parties to be partially free from 
anyone’s local jurisdiction, a very important factor to foreign investors. 4 
However, arbitration cannot be completely independent from a national jurisdiction system, 
especially since the arbitration award must be recognized and enforced by local courts. For 
decades, many conventions attempted to fascinate the recognition and enforcement of 
international arbitration awards throughout the world. These conventions such as the New York 
Convention had a significant impact on the development of arbitration in the international 
context.  
After China opened its door to the world, arbitration was used as a means to meet the 
requirement of daily increasing foreign investments in the country. Its arbitration system has 
been built up and its national arbitration law was made after the UNCITRAL Model Law. After 
China became a new member of World Trade Organization, international investment is expected 
to grow even more quickly, so arbitration in China should develop in line with recognized 
                                                 
1 Details (hereinafter “ADR”)  
2 Lucy V. Katz, Enforcing an ADR Clause – Are Good Intentions All You Have?, 26 Am. Bus. L.J. 575, 577 (1988). 
3 Christine Lecuyer-Thieffry & Patrick Thieffry, Negotiating Settlement of Disputes Provisions in International 
Business Contracts: Recent Developments in Arbitration and Other Processes, 45 Bus. Law. 557, 581 (1990).  
4 Shengchang Wang, Resolving Disputes in the P.R.C. 48 (1996). 
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international standards. However, since the importance and influence of arbitration in China has 
only developed in recent years, there are still some defects in its regulations and practice. One 
group of defects involves the recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards in China, as 
many foreign investors and writers have complained.5 Some foreign writers criticized the defects 
in the enforcement of arbitration awards as “legendary for victorious parties seeking to enforce 
awards in China.”6 Others claim that “China’s spotty record in honoring international arbitration 
awards even constitute one of the reasons cited for the delay in China’s admittance to the World 
Trade Organization.”7 This paper will examine these defects, introduce the efforts made by 
Chinese legal authorities, discuss the regulations and practices in other countries such as the US, 
and try to find ways to minimize these defects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth From Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC, 
49 Am. J. Comp. L., 249, 250 (2001 Spring). Also see Chlarles Kenworthey Harer, Arbitration Fails to Reduce 
Foreign Investor’s Risk in China, 8 Pac. Kim L. & Pol’y 393 (March, 1999). 
6 Pat K. Chew, Political Risk and U.S. Investments in China: Chimera of Protection and Predictability?, 34 Va. J. 
Int’l L. 615, 639(1994). 
7 Brown & Rogers, supra note 143, at 348. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION AWARD 
A. A Brief Introduction to International Commercial Arbitration 
I. The Development of International Commercial Arbitration 
Arbitration, one type of ADR method,8 is a dispute resolution process where a neutral third 
party who is authorized voluntarily by the disputing parties and in accordance with certain 
procedural rules renders a decision that is final and binding on those parties.9 “Arbitration is a 
private, generally informal, and non judicial trial procedure for adjudication disputes.”10 It 
occupies “a space between business and politics,”11 and has long–existed throughout the world as 
an alternative to judicial resolution of local disputes.12  
After World War II, with the explosive development of international transactions and 
business,13 the number of international commercial disputes continues increasing.14 Compared 
with disputes in domestic business, disputes in international business are more likely to occur 
due to the different cultural background of the parties involved, language barriers, and other 
                                                 
8 Andrew & Sagartz, Resolution of International Commercial Disputes: Surmounting Barriers of Culture Without 
Going to Court, 13 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 675, 675 (1998). 
9 Wang, supra note 4, at 5. For other definition of “arbitration”, see Gary B.Born, International Commercial 
Arbitration in the United States, Commentary & Materials, 1 (1994). 
10 Thomas E. Carbonneau, Cases and Materials on The Law and Practice of Arbitration 2 (2nd ed. 2000). 
11 Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction 
of a Transnational Legal Order 274 (1996). 
12 Wang, supra note 4, at 5. 
13 Frank L. Acuff, How to Negotiate Anything with Anyone Anywhere Around the World 11-13 (1993). 
Transnational business involves six main types of transactions: joint ventures, licensing agreements, turnkey 
projects, subcontracts, management contracts and financial arrangements. 
14 Thomas S. Mackey, Litigation Involving Damages to U.S. Plaintiffs Caused by Private Corporate Japanese 
Defendants, 5 Transnat’l Law. 131, 150 (1992). 
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cultural reasons.15 Since arbitration resembles the familiar litigation scheme16 by permitting the 
parties to avoid many of the problems associated with litigation17 while having its own merits 
over litigation18, arbitration is viewed as a normal way to solve international commercial 
disputes, making international arbitration grow quickly.19  
II. The Merits of International Commercial Arbitration 
Foreign investors look at arbitration as a main method to solve disputes mainly because of 
the following natures. First, flexibility and adaptability of the arbitration procedure is the primary 
advantage of international commercial arbitration. This scheme permits parties from two 
different countries to exercise a great deal of control over how a dispute is resolved.20 Parties can 
choose the place of arbitration, the nationality or qualifications of the arbitrators, and the 
language of the arbitration process. Furthermore, the parties can even choose the applicable 
substantive law, thus “circumventing a country’s fledgling commercial law that may not provide 
the predictability that the parties seek.”21  
Second, neutrality is another advantage of arbitration since the parties are able to insulate 
themselves, at least partially, from real and perceived local biases that can influence a proceeding 
existing in a hostile jurisdiction, in a foreign language, and before an adjudicator who may be 
                                                 
15 Jeswald W. Salacuse, Making Global Deals 45 (1991). 
16 Like judgment, arbitration award is binding and enforceable. 
17 For foreign investors, to have disputes solved in other countries always means unfamiliar laws, legal procedures, 
foreign languages, possible preferences of the judge, and even national bias. 
18 Compared with litigation, arbitration is efficient and cost saving. Furthermore, arbitration provides privacy, 
sophisticated arbitrators and so on. The merits of arbitration are introduced clearly in section B of part II.  
19 W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration, 30 Tex. Int’l L.J. 1, 1 (1995). 
20 Dezalay & Garth, supra note 9, at 273.  
21 Robert Donald Fischer & Roger S. Haydock, International Commercial Disputes Drafting an Enforceable 
Arbitration Agreement, 21 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 941, 951 (1996). 
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more sympathetic to the local party.22 This allows the parties to extend more control over the 
resolution process. 
Third, arbitration provides the protection of parties’ privacy. Almost all types of arbitration 
proceeding remain confidential.23 Some arbitration tribunals are not required to keep a record of 
the hearing either in writing or by tape,24 thus making the parties’ commercial secrets remaining 
uncovered. 
Fourth, compared with the use of litigation, the use of arbitration reduces legal expenses and 
time needed to settle disputes.25 The arbitration process is normally measured in months instead 
of years it can take to resolve disputes in the litigation system. While trials are dictated by 
detailed rules and procedures that evolved to accommodate an extremely broad array of disputes 
in society, arbitration procedures developed as “a streamlined alternative” to provide fast, fair 
and final resolution.26 Furthermore, arbitration can reduce cost because of significantly reduced 
attorney fees and transaction costs since the party can choose the place of arbitration that is easy 
for all parties to access.27 In the United States, people favor international arbitration mostly 
because of this efficiency and cost.28 
Fifth, since the parties of the dispute have the right to appoint their own arbitrators,29 and 
most arbitrators serve on different arbitration commissions are experts in certain areas.30 This 
                                                 
22 Wang, supra note 4, at 48. 
23 Id. 
24 Arbitration Rules of China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (Hereinafter CIETAC) 
art.43 (2000). 
25 Michael F. Hoellering, World Trade: To Arbitrate or Mediate—That the Question, Disp. Resol. J. 65, 67 (1994). 
26 Fischer & Haydock, supra note 19, at 954. 
27 Id. 
28 Susan L. Karamanian, The Road to the Tribunal and Beyond: International Commercial Arbitration and United 
States Courts, 34 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 17, 17 (2002) The United States Senate was urged to be a contracting 
state of the New York Convention and adopted the Convention Act in its Chapter 2 of Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA). “because the people engaged in foreign trade consider arbitration… a very economical and speedy way of 
settling commercial disputes. ” See also S. Comm on Foreign Relations, Foreign Arbitral Awards, S. Rep. No. 91-
702, at 10 (1970) (Statement of Richard D. Kearney, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State). 
29 Robert Donald Fischer and Roger S. Haydock, International Commercial Disputes Drafting an Enforceable 
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allows disputes to be efficiently solved by experienced arbitrators who are appointed because of 
their special expertise and background in a certain area.31 This, too, makes arbitration a preferred 
way to resolve disputes. 
Sixth, the multilateral conventions for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
are rare,32 so it is difficult to enforce foreign judgments in other countries.33 On the contrary, 
international arbitration awards are enforceable in most countries under current international 
conventions34 especially the UNCITRAL35 Model Law36 and the New York Convention,37 which 
excludes any judicial review of the substantive content of a foreign arbitration award by the court 
where enforcement is sought.38 In some countries such as the United States, national courts even 
offer greater deference to international arbitral awards than to domestic arbitration awards under 
the New York Convention.39 
Lastly, a national court judgment will not be final until after one or more appellate review, 
thus causing the final judgment to be very time consuming and uncertain.40 However, arbitration 
awards are usually binding and final once they are rendered, and by allowing the parties to 
choose the place of arbitration, the nationality or qualifications of the arbitrators, and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Arbitration Agreement, 21 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 941, 964-965 (Spring, 1996). 
30 Fischer & Haydock, supra note 19, at 950. 
31 Stephen Patrick Doyle & Roger Silve Haydock, Without Punches: Resolving Disputes  Without Litigation 17 
(1991). 
32 Craig, supra note 17, at 3. 
33 Michael J. Mustill, Arbitration: History and Background, J. Int’l Arb. 41, 43 (1989). 
34 Mackey, supra note 12, at 180. 
35 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, hereinafter UNCITRAL. 
36 The Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law. U.N. Gaor, 40th 
Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex I, at 81, U.N.Doc. A/40/17 (1985) ; 24 I.L.M. 1302. For introduction on Model Law, see 
Part II (III) of this paper.  
37 Also called Convention on The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, hereinafter the New 
York Convention, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38. For discussion about the New York Convention, see Part 
II (III) of this paper.  
38The New York Convention, supra note 35, art. I-III. 
39 Eloise Henderson Bouzari, The Public Policy Exception to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards: 
Implications for Post-NAFTA Jurisprudence, 30 Tex. Int’l L.J. 205, 207-208 (1995). 
40 See Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Shearson v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 257-58 (1987). 
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applicable substantive law, it is much easier for the parties to predict the result of the dispute 
concerning the parties.41 
B. Definition of Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitration Awards 
Although arbitration is viewed as a “private rule of law”,42 the parties’ control over their 
legal destiny through arbitration is far from absolute. Since it is inherently a private system of 
dispute resolution, international commercial arbitration cannot supplant or function completely 
independently of the national court system.43 “In arbitration proceedings, national courts serve 
two functions: assistance and control.”44 National courts can be liable for refusing the application 
of a party to commence a lawsuit when an arbitration agreement exists in advance of the dispute. 
In some instances, national courts can assist in the appointment, revocation, or replacement of 
arbitrators.45 What’s more, the recognition and enforcement of international commercial 
arbitration, a key function of the international commercial arbitration system, relies on national 
courts.46 Recognition of an arbitration award means “giving effect to the award to bar litigation 
on the same issues settled in arbitration” while enforcement means “applying judicial remedies 
to assure that the award is carried out.”47 In practice, if a court chooses to enforce a foreign 
arbitral award, it will first recognize the award then order the award’s validity and binding effect 
                                                 
41 Scherk v. Alberto- Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974). 
42 Henry P. Devries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts, 57 Tul. L. 
Rev. 42, 61 (1982) 
43 Id. at 72. 
44 Id. at 47. 
45 Id. at 61. 
46 Hang Song, Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in International Commercial Arbitration 24 (1st 
ed. 2000)  
47 James H. Carter, Litigating in Foreign Territory: Arbitration Alternatives and Enforcement Issues, Presentation 
Before the American Bar Association Center for Continuing Legal Education, National Institute, Doing Business 
Worldwide (Feb. 8-10 1998), at 7. 
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on all parties. Recognition of an award is “an integral part of enforcement,” so recognition and 
enforcement are “always inextricably linked.”48  
C. Conventions on the Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards 
      Compared with the enforcement of domestic international arbitral awards, the enforcement of 
international arbitral awards is much more complex and is commonly regulated by international 
treaties.49 Historically, many international organizations have attempted to ensure the 
enforceability of arbitral awards by creating international treaties. Among them, the New York 
Convention is currently the most important international treaty concerning the recognition and 
enforcement of international arbitration awards.50 To some degree, the enforcement of 
international arbitration awards means the actual enforcement of the New York Convention.51 
However, this does not discount the importance of other multilateral conventions such as the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes of 
1965.52  
I. The New York Convention 
      As early as 1953, to rectify the deficiencies in the Geneva Treaties53 and to further facilitate 
the enforcement of international arbitral awards, the International Chamber of Commerce 
devised a draft of the New York Convention and submitted it to the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council. The New York Convention was discussed in the United Nations 
International Commercial Arbitration Conference in New York in May 1958, officially passed 
                                                 
48 Xiaoyang Zhang, Settlement of Commercial Disputes with Foreign Elements Involved in Arbitration: Legal 
Theories and Practice in the United Kingdom, 12 Fla. J.Int’l L. 167, 179 (1998). 
49 Hu Li, Enforcement of the International Commercial Arbitration Award 57 (1st ed. 2000). 
50 Mustill, supra note 31, at 49. 
51 Li, supra note 47, at 57. 
52 Hereinafter ICSID Convention. For discussion about ICSID Convention, see Part II (III) of this paper. 
53 The Geneva Convention consisted of the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses (Geneva Protocol) and the 
Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Geneva Convention). Although the Geneva 
Convention was replaced by the New York Convention, it marked the beginning attempt to unify and liberalize 
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on May 10, 1958, and took effect on July 7, 1959.54 It is currently the most important convention 
related to the recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards and has been hailed as 
the “cornerstone of current international commercial arbitration.”55 Until August of 1998, one 
hundred and forty-five state or areas acceded to the New York Convention,56 demonstrating the 
states’ satisfaction.   
      The New York Convention stipulates that international arbitral awards shall be enforced by 
each contracting state “in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award 
is relied upon.”57 The reasons for refusing to enforce international arbitral awards are expressly 
limited to five grounds under the Article V.58 The New York Convention serves to ensure the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements, thus freeing arbitration from the limitations of laws and 
regulations applied in the arbitration place, and to promote the enforcement of an arbitral award, 
whether commercial or not,59 on an international scale.60 We can safely say that without the New 
York Convention, there is no international commercial arbitration. 
II. The UNCITRAL Model Law  
      To create uniform arbitration laws and to assist developing countries with arbitration laws, 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (hereinafter UNCITRAL) approved 
a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (hereinafter Model Law) in 1985.61 The 
Model Law provides a “modern procedural framework which … is liberal in its provisions and 
                                                                                                                                                             
international commercial arbitration, and created the “fundamental underpinnings” of the New York Convention. 
54  Li, supra note 47, at 57. 
55 Albert  J. Van Den Berg , The New York Convention of 1958 1 (1981). 
56 Li, supra note 47, at 57.  
57 The New York Convention, supra note 35, art. III. 
58 Id. at art. V.  
59 However, the New York Convention permits contracting states make “commercial reservation.” 
60 While the New York Convention permits contracting states make “reciprocity reservation,” it intends to fascinate 
the enforcement of arbitral award all over the world. 
61 Houston P. Lowry, International Commercial Law and Arbitration 251, 345 (1991). UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Gaor, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex I, at 81,U.N.Doc. A/40/17 (1985) 
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… delocalized, without neglecting fundamental requirements of procedural justice or due 
process.”62 It “reflects an attempt to fashion and codify an international consensus on the 
statutory framework that should apply to arbitration in national jurisdiction.”63 The purpose of 
the provisions is to clarify the areas where local courts may or may not intervene.64 Since the 
Model Law was finally completed in 1985,65 over twenty nations, including China, have adopted 
at least some version of the Model Law without making substantial modifications in their 
following establishment or rectification of arbitration laws.66 As a model recommended by the 
UNCITRAL, the Model Law has deeply influenced the development of international arbitration. 
      Unlike the New York Convention, the Model Law applies only to international commercial 
arbitration, whether the arbitration is “ad hoc in nature or administered by a permanent arbitral 
institution.”67 However, the Model Law can also be adopted to regulate domestic arbitration.68 In 
the course of adopting the Model Law, some countries made a few modifications or supplements, 
but were noted as not being substantial.69 In addition, because domestic arbitration laws in 
different countries are at quite different levels, the Model Law could be used to regulate the 
assistance and control of the courts and to provide uniform enforcement of arbitral awards.70  
                                                                                                                                                             
; 24 I.L.M. 1302 hereinafter the Model Law. 
62 Carl-August Fleischhauer, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 41 Arb. J. 17, 19 
(1986). 
63 Carbonneau, supra note 8, at 800. 
64 Possible areas that courts may intervene and that the Model Law does not regulate, include: the impact of state 
immunity, the competence of the arbitral tribunal to adopt contracts, the period of time for enforcement of arbitral 
awards, and the fixing of fees and deposits. See Isaak Dore, the UNCITRAL Framework for Arbitration in 
Contemporary Perspective 104 (1993). 
65 Kenneth T. Ungar, Note, The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, 25 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 717, 719 (1987). 
66 Jane L. Volz & Roger S. Haydock, Foreign Arbitral Awards: Enforcing the Award Against the Recalcitrant 
Loser, 21 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 867, 886 (1996). 
67 Melissa Gerardi, Jumpstarting APEC in the Race to “Open Regionalism:” A Proposal for the Multilateral 
Adoption of UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 15 J. Intl. L. Bus. 668, 686 (1995). 
68 Li, Supra note 47, at 21. For example, Hong Kong established its law on domestic arbitration following the Model 
Law. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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      Although the New York Convention provides for a satisfactory means of enforcing 
international arbitral awards, over one half the United Nations members has not adopted it. 71 By 
adopting some rules on the recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards from the 
New York Convention, the Model Law provides basic rules for the recognition and enforcement 
of international arbitral awards.72 Such basic rules do not conflict with the rules of the New York 
Convention, but instead constitute an alternative to the rules of the New York Convention for 
those nations that were reluctant to accede to the New York Convention due to political 
motivation.73  
      Further, unlike the New York Convention which draws a line between "foreign" or “not 
domestic” and "domestic" awards, the Model Law draws a new line between “international" and 
"non-international" awards by treating awards rendered in international commercial arbitration in 
a uniform manner irrespective of where they were made.74 This new line is based on substantive 
grounds75 instead of territorial borders, “which are inappropriate in view of the limited 
importance of the place of arbitration in international cases.”76 As a result, the recognition and 
enforcement of "international" awards, whether "foreign," “not domestic,” or "domestic," are 
governed by the same provisions of the Model Law.77 Therefore, “by modeling the recognition 
and enforcement rules on the relevant provisions of the 1958 New York Convention, the Model 
                                                 
71 Volz & Haydock, supra note 64, at 887. 
72 Jernej Sekolec, The Need for Modern and Harmonized Regime for International Arbitration, 1 Croat. Arbit. 
Yearb. 27, 30-31 (1994). 
73 UNCITRAL Model Law provides a “‘back door’ means of acceding to the New York Convention.” See Para. 46 
of the Note by the Secretariat on UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb.htm.  
74 Id. 
75 For the grounds for “international” arbitration, see article I (3) of UNCITRAL Model Law.  
76 See Para. 46 of the Note by the Secretariat on UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. 
Supra note 81. 
77 Id.  
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Law supplements, without conflicting with, the regime of recognition and enforcement created 
by that successful Convention.”78 
III. ICSID Convention 
      The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes of 1965 (ICSID Convention),79 
often referred to as the Washington Convention of 1965, established a truly autonomous and 
self-contained dispute resolution system on the investment disputes.80 The International Center 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an international institution created by the ICSID 
Convention, administers the system81 to solve investment disputes between governments and 
foreign investors.82 
       ICSID deals with a dispute that is: (1) a “legal” dispute arising “directly out of an 
investment;” (2) a dispute between a contracting state, or its designated constituent and a 
national of another contracting state; and (3) the parties of the dispute agreed to have there 
dispute settled by ICSID.83 Since the ICSID was adopted in 1965, one hundred and forty-five 
countries have become signatories of the ICSID Convention by 1995 and nearly thirty 
investment disputes were solved by the ICSID during that time.84 
      The ICSID Convention established a “truly international” form of arbitration for dealing with 
investment disputes that arise between foreign investors and host states.85 One significant nature 
of the ICSID Convention is that the arbitration procedure is governed entirely and exclusively by 
                                                 
78 Id. at para. 47. 
79 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 hereinafter ICSID Convention. 
80 Aron Broches, Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards, 6 ICSID Rev. 321, 322 (1991). 
81 Id. at 322. 
82 William K. Slate II, International Arbitration: Do Institutions Make a Difference?, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 41, 45 
(1996). 
83 Michael F. Hoellering, Arbitration Involving Foreign Governments and Their Instrumentalities, in Arbitration & 
the Law: AAA General Counsel’s Annual Report, 1992-93 124, 127 (1993). 
84 Song, supra note 46, at 46. 
85 Carbonneau, supra note 8, at 783. 
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the ICSID Convention.86 Once the arbitral award is rendered pursuant to the ICSID Convention, 
it “shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to appeal or to any other remedy 
except those provided for in the ICSID Convention.”87 All the contracting states should 
recognize and enforce the ICSID arbitral awards as the final judgments rendered by domestic 
courts unless the ICSID itself set them aside pursuant to the ICSID Convention.88  
      Compared with the New York Convention, ICSID Convention establishes an independent 
field in which arbitration cases are only governed by the ICSID Convention itself while not 
subject to the jurisdiction of a contracting party’s domestic arbitration laws.89 Generally, the 
ICSID Convention shall apply as long as the party meets the requirements of accepting a case as 
noted by the Convention.90   
       
                                                 
86 Broches, supra note 78, at 322. 
87 ICSID Convention, supra note 84, at art. 50-53. 
88 Song, supra note 46, at 46. 
89 Li, supra note 47, at 114. 
90 Id. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 
IN CHINA 
A. Introduction to Arbitration in China 
As a means of settling disputes in China, arbitration has been adopted in China since 1954, 
but only thirty-eight cases were arbitrated between 1956 and 1979. 91 Before the adoption of the 
Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China92 in 1995, there were fourteen laws, eighty 
central administrative regulations and about two hundred local administrative regulations 
involving arbitration.93 However, most provisions were quite different from the standard 
arbitration principles used throughout the world.94 The importance and influence of arbitration 
has grown significantly only over the last few decades.95 Unlike arbitration in the U.S. where the 
growth of arbitration has been driven by the expense and burden of domestic litigation,96 
arbitration is welcomed by foreign investors in China because it is an effective way to solve 
international commercial disputes. After China opened its door to the world in 1978, the 
development of international and domestic business required reform of its law related to 
arbitration and China’s 1995 Arbitration Law was adopted to meet this need.97 Consequently, the 
importance and influence of arbitration in China has grown significantly over the last few 
                                                 
91 Ge Liu & Alexander Lourie, International Commercial Arbitration in China: History, New Development, and 
Current Practice, 28 J. Marshall L. Rev. 539, 541 (1995). 
92 Arbitration Law of P.R C. was passed at the Ninth Standing Community Session of the Eighth National People’s 
Congress on August 31, 1994 and took into effect on September 1, 1995 (Hereinafter “ 1995 Arbitration Law”). An 
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decades.98 However, arbitration in China is still somewhat different from other countries. For 
example, while arbitration is divided into domestic and international arbitration in most other 
countries, in China, arbitration is divided into domestic, foreign-related and foreign arbitration. 
In practice, this division causes the deficiency surrounding Chinese arbitration. 
I. 1995 Arbitration Law  
      As the first unified and relatively complete law that regulates both domestic and foreign-
related arbitration in China, the 1995 Arbitration Law brings great systematic and procedural 
development in the field of arbitration in China.99 This legislation was an effort to normalize 
economic relationships between China and foreign parties.100 The 1995 Arbitration Law, 
modeled after the UNCITRAL Model Law, consists of eight chapters and two hundred and sixty 
articles, all of which establish the institutional framework for the creation of Arbitration 
Commissions that are administratively independent from the Chinese government.101 It regulates 
the requirements for the establishment of Arbitration Commissions that will administer domestic 
arbitrations in centrally governed municipalities, capital cities of the provinces, and other major 
commercial and industrial cities,102 the composition of the Arbitration Commissions, 103 and the 
qualifications for appointment of arbitrators.104  
      The 1995 Arbitration Law also calls for the establishment of the China Arbitration 
Association (CAA), a non-governmental, self-regulating organization overseeing its member 
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Commissions in China, to supervise the work of the Arbitration Commissions. 105 The CAA is a 
separate legal entity including all members of the various arbitration commissions.106 
      The 1995 Arbitration Law is a procedural law in nature and does not directly affect the nature 
or proceedings of international arbitration in China.107 It divides arbitration in China into 
domestic and foreign-related arbitration.108 In Chapter 7, it provides “special provisions” on the 
“arbitration of disputes involving a foreign element and trade, transport and maritime 
interests.”109 These special provisions not only clarify that domestic arbitration is different from 
foreign-related arbitration, but also impose relatively fewer limits on foreign-related arbitration 
in China that is more flexible and independent.110 However, unlike the French statute,111 the 
Arbitration Law does not clearly provide whether the parties of an international commercial 
dispute can choose to have the arbitration governed by law other than Chinese laws. 
Furthermore, under the 1995 arbitration law, the parties cannot exclude judicial recourse or 
Chinese arbitral procedures.112 While in England the parties may exclude judicial recourse but 
not English arbitral procedures. In France, the opposite is true as the parties may exclude arbitral 
procedures but not judicial recourse.113 
II. Domestic arbitration 
                                                 
105 Id. at art 15. 
106 Id. at art 15. 
107 Dejun Cheng et al, International Arbitration in the People’s Republic of China: Commentary, Cases and 
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      Before the Arbitration Law took into effect in 1995, domestic Arbitration Commissions were 
set up in the State and Local Administration of Industry and Commerce Agencies in accordance 
with the enabling Regulations on Arbitration for Economic Contracts of China.114 These 
Arbitration Commissions dealt with domestic arbitration that were mainly related to economic 
contract disputes through these Commissions’ regulative authority without proper arbitration 
agreements between the parties. In contrary, the arbitration agreement prior to the application for 
arbitration is a prerequisite of arbitration in the Arbitration Law of 1995115. Furthermore, an 
arbitration award is not final because parties can appeal to the courts and courts can deal with the 
same disputes.116 In the past, arbitration was a coercive administrative measure to solve 
economic disputes that was far different from the definition of traditional arbitration.117 It is 
obvious that arbitration under the centralized planning economy could not adapt to the 
development of market economy in China.118 
      The 1995 Arbitration Law has brought dramatic changes to the arbitration process in China. 
This law requires that all former Arbitration Commissions cease to work and from that point on, 
new and government independent Arbitration Commissions are established to follow the 
Arbitration Law.119 Now, a unified and independent domestic arbitration system has been 
established. Presently, there are almost one hundred and fifty domestic Arbitration Commissions 
in China.120 
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      According to the 1995 Arbitration Law, a dispute can be arbitrated only if there is a valid 
arbitration agreement between the parties.121 The arbitration agreement must be in writing 
whether it is a clause in the contract or a separate agreement concluded before or after a dispute 
arises.122 In either way, an arbitration agreement must always include: (1) a clear expression of 
the intention to submit disputes to arbitration, 123 (2) the specific matters that are subject to 
arbitration,124 and (3) the selected arbitration commission to resolve the dispute.125 If the first two 
elements are not clearly written into the agreement, it is invalid; while the arbitration 
commission can be selected at a later date.126 The subsequent modification, rescission, 
termination, nullification, or invalidity of a contract does not necessarily invalidate an arbitration 
agreement.127 However, if the parties contest the validity of an arbitration agreement, either the 
court or the arbitration commission can decide the validity of the agreement.128 If one party 
appeal to a court while the other party appeals to an arbitration commission, the court will decide 
the validity of the arbitration agreement.129 
      The jurisdiction of arbitration commissions is substantially enlarged under the 1995 
Arbitration Law. Except for a few family-related disputes expressly excluded by this law, such as 
“cases arising from marriage, adoption, guardianship, child support, inheritance,130 and disputes 
that have been stipulated by law to be settled by administrative organs,”131 most domestic 
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disputes including the validity and infringement of patents, trademarks, and copyrights,132 are 
arbitrable if there is a valid arbitration agreement between the parties.133 A Domestic Arbitration 
Commission can also deal with international or foreign-related disputes if the parties have agreed 
to submit their disputes to this Arbitration Commission according to several regulations imposed 
after 1995.134 These regulations changed the situation that only international Arbitration 
Commissions are permitted to resolve international or foreign-related disputes.135  
III. Foreign-related arbitration 
On May 6, 1954, the central government of China issued a Decision to establish an 
international commercial arbitration institution.136 To meet the requirement of this Decision, the 
Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of China (FTAC) was set up within China’s Council for 
the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT). 137 FTAC was directed “to settle such disputes as 
may arise from contracts and transactions in foreign trade, particularly disputes between foreign 
firms, companies or other economic organizations on the one hand and Chinese firms, companies 
or other economic organizations on the other,” 138 i.e., foreign-related disputes. To fulfill this 
charge, FTAC promulgated its Arbitration Rules--the Provisional Rules of the Foreign Trade 
Arbitration Commission of China.139 Furthermore, the State Council of China issued a decree on 
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November 21, 1958 authorizing CCPIT to establish the Maritime Arbitration Commission 
(MAC) to handle international maritime arbitrations. 140 However, due to the international 
isolation policy, highly centralized planning economics, and internal political and economic 
turmoil during the 1960s and 1970s, international arbitrations in China were rare until the 
1980s.141  
Since China opened its door to the world in 1978, the economy of China has witnessed 
dramatic growth.142 While international trade always involves trading partners from diverse 
cultural backgrounds, the distinction between eastern and western legal traditions is much more 
pronounced than the distinctions among different western legal traditions. 143 Since there is no 
international court for the resolution of business disputes and it is normal for the investor to be 
reluctant to have the dispute solved by a court in the other party’s home country applying its 
domestic laws, 144arbitration helps bridge the gap between East and West. Arbitration provides 
both a forum and a process by which both parties can agree to participate while disagreeing 
about anything else.145 The nature of investment and the role of law in China make international 
arbitration a particularly attractive alternative for both foreign investors in China and Chinese 
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businesspersons. Parties often take for granted that since arbitrators are more independent from 
government than Chinese judges, the fairness of arbitration must be more guaranteed.146  
To meet the requirement of the development of the economy, newly established Arbitration 
Commissions, rules and regulations dealing with domestic and international economic 
transactions and other affairs have emerged and received positive acceptance. Today, 
international arbitration is an important and frequently used method for settling international 
disputes in China, as evidenced by the prevalence of arbitration as a primary dispute resolution 
device in China’s business-related legislation 147and the heavy caseload of international 
arbitration commissions in China.148 
Compared with domestic arbitration institutes, Chinese international arbitration bodies are 
relatively independent and competent.149 The premier international arbitration institution in 
China is the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) that 
was formed from FTAC in 1988.150 According to the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC151, the scope 
of its jurisdiction includes not only domestic disputes, but also international or foreign-related 
disputes, both commercial and other common disputes.152 The rules of CIETAC are also much 
more in line with recognized international standards. For example: (1) They permit foreign 
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arbitrators to be included in the panel of arbitrator 153(currently 296 members, including eighty 
foreign nationals).154(2) They permit foreign parties to use their own non-Chinese attorneys.155 
(3) They permit parties to agree on the language used during arbitration.156 (4) They require an 
arbitration tribunal to render an arbitration award within nine months as from the date when the 
tribunal is formed.157 (5) The arbitration award made by CIETAC is final and binding upon both 
disputing parties. Neither party may bring the same suit before a law court or make a request to 
any other institution to revise the arbitration award.158 (6) The Rules provide a summary 
procedure for cases where the amount of the claim totals no more than $500,000 RMB without 
the parties' permission (over that amount only if the parties agree). 159 Under this system, only 
one arbitrator, appointed by the parties or the Chairman of CIETAC,160 will handle the case, 
mainly relying on the documents when an oral hearing is not necessary.161 This summary 
procedure simplifies the handling of certain types of disputes to ensure a speedy arbitration 
resolve.162 (7) They set up a specific chapter of domestic arbitration which is different with the 
provisions on international or foreign-related arbitration.163  
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      With these new regulations and after years of development, CIETAC arbitration has become 
much more sophisticated than in earlier days.164 Nearly all international or foreign-related 
commercial arbitrations in China are conducted in Beijing at CIETAC or in Shenzhen or 
Shanghai where CIETAC operates its sub-commissions. 165 The caseload of CIETAC has 
continued to increase rapidly, reaching 902 admitted cases in 1995, 166an estimated 600 cases in 
1996167 and 723 cases in 1997.168 At present, CIETAC has more international arbitration cases 
than any other arbitration body in the world.169 
      Another international arbitration body in China is the China Maritime Arbitration 
Commission (CMAC)170 which works with CIETAC to resolve almost all international business 
disputes in China.171 The arbitration rules and practices of CMAC are quite similar to those of 
CIETAC.172 CMAC is the only Maritime arbitration agency in China and has 97 maritime law 
experts.173 Compared with CIETAC, CMAC handles a relative small number of international 
cases each year.174 
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B. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-Related Arbitration Awards in China  
        Arbitration awards rendered by Chinese Arbitration Institutes can be divided into domestic 
arbitration awards and foreign-related ones,175 and they are treated differently in some ways 
including the recognition and enforcement.176 Here, I will only discuss the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign-related arbitration awards. 
Prior to 1982, there was no legal provision in Chinese law for the enforcement of arbitration 
awards, 177 not to mention for the recognition and enforcement of foreign-related arbitration 
awards. Today in China, the recognition and enforcement of foreign-related arbitration awards 
follow the 1995 Arbitration Law, the Law of Civil Procedure of the People’s Republic of 
China178 and the transparency in the Chinese legal system to encourage international trade in 
China provided by the New York Convention.179 
I. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-Related Arbitration Awards under Civil 
Procedure Law 
Under the 1991 Civil Procedure Law in China, the parties of foreign-related arbitration may 
seek enforcement in China of the arbitral award decided by a Chinese arbitration commission.180 
The party seeking enforcement of an award must apply in writing to the Intermediate People’s 
Court in the place where the unwilling party resides or has property.181 The time limit for the 
enforcement, if neither party is an individual, is six months but it is one year if one or both of the 
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parties are individuals,182 starting on the last day of the fixed period of time under which the 
award was executed.183 Compared with such time limit in other countries, such as three years in 
the United States and six years in British, this six months or one year time period is relatively 
shorter and should be reasonably lengthened.184 Generally, the People’s Courts enforce a foreign-
related arbitration award within six months after deciding to initiate an arbitration award 
enforcement case.185 
II. Refusal to Enforce Foreign-Related Arbitration Awards in China 
According to Article 71 of the 1995 Arbitration Law, a court shall refuse to enforce a 
foreign-related arbitration award if the objecting party can provide sufficient evidence to prove 
that the award falls within one or more of the following circumstances proscribed in Section 1 of 
Article 260 of the 1991 Civil Procedure Law:186  
(1) parties have not stipulated clauses on arbitration in the contract or have not subsequently 
reached a written agreement on arbitration;187 (2) party against whom the application is 
made is not duly notified to appoint an arbitrator or to proceed with the arbitration, or fails to 
state his/her opinions due to reasons for which he is not held responsible;188 (3) the 
composition of the arbitration division or the procedure for arbitration is not in conformity 
with the rules of the arbitration commission where the award is rendered;189 and (4) matters 
decided exceed the scope of the arbitration agreement or the limits of authority of the 
arbitration agency. 190  
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The losing party who failed to fulfill its obligations of the award has the burden to prove the 
ground for the refusal.191 If the court holds that the enforcement will undermine “social or public 
interest,” it will refuse to enforce the award without losing party’s petition.192  
         The above mentioned circumstances under which a court shall refuse to enforce a foreign-
related arbitration award are similar to the seven circumstances listed in Article V of the New 
York Convention193 because China became a contracting country of the New York Convention 
before the Chinese Civil Procedure Law was promulgated in 1991194 (some rules of the 1991 
Civil Procedure law were made after the New York Convention).195 However, there are still 
some differences between the regulations in the 1991 Chinese Civil Procedure Law and those in 
the New York Convention such as reasons to refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign-related 
arbitration award.  
First, under Article V (1) (a) of the New York Convention, the incapacity of the parties to 
reach an arbitration agreement or the invalidity of the arbitration agreement is a ground to refuse 
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enforcement. 196 In Article 260 (1) of the Civil Procedure Law, the non-existence of a written 
arbitration agreement is the ground for refusal.197 The ground under the Chinese Civil Procedure 
Law looks narrower than the New York Convention provision, but in practice the incapacity of 
the parties and the invalidity of the arbitration agreement will lead to the non-existence of an 
arbitration agreement.198 Even with these differences, the consequences of the two provisions 
remain the same. 
Next, under Article 260 (3) of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law, another reason leading 
to non-enforcement is that the composition of the arbitration tribunal or the procedure of 
arbitration conflicts with rules of the arbitration commission199 even if the composing is in 
accordance with the agreement made by the parties, or absent such agreement, with the law of 
the country where the arbitration took place.200 Under all Chinese arbitration commission rules, 
if parties want to have their disputes arbitrated in a Chinese arbitration commission, the 
arbitration should only been performed in accordance with the rules of such arbitration 
commission. Partly or fully changing or excluding the rules of such arbitration commission or 
choosing the rules of another arbitration commission can only be done with the permission from 
the arbitration commission,201 which rarely happens in Chinese international arbitration 
activities. This makes the agreement of self-selecting arbitration rules just a piece of paper.202 
Since all arbitration rules of the Chinese Arbitration Commissions are adopted in accordance 
with the 1995 Arbitration Law, practically this provision does not result in the dilemma that the 
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composition or the procedure is consistent with arbitration rules but conflict with the 1995 
Arbitration Law or visa verse.203 However, compared with the New York Convention, this 
provision is not flexible and certainly should be revised to make the choice of arbitration 
procedure rules possible in Chinese foreign-related arbitration, thus providing parties in disputes 
more rights of self-determination.204 
Third, under the New York Convention, the invalidity of an award can be grounds for a 
court to refuse to enforce an award,205 unlike the Civil Procedure Law where this ground is not 
explicitly stated as a reason for non-enforcement.206 However, the Arbitration Law provides that 
if one party appeal to a court to withdraw an award during its enforcement, the court should 
cease to enforce the award until the petition for withdrawing the award is refused.207 This 
provision implies that if an award is nullified, the award cannot be enforced. So in China, the 
invalidity of an award is also a ground for non-enforcement of an award.  
Fourth, under the New York Convention, a court of a contracting state may refuse to 
enforce an award if the dispute of the award is inarbitrable under the laws of that country.208 In 
the Civil Procedure Law, this is a ground if the dispute of an award goes beyond the authority of 
the arbitration commission where the award was rendered, thus the enforcement should be 
refused.209 In China, the subject matters that can be arbitrated by every arbitration commission 
are always within the scope of what can be arbitrated under the Arbitration Law. In the past, 
various arbitration commissions used to be permitted to solve disputes,210 so in China a matter 
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which was arbitrable under Chinese laws could be refused enforcement because it was 
inarbitrable under the rules of the arbitration commission, a practice contrary to the spirit of the 
New York Convention. Although currently both domestic and international arbitration 
commissions are now permitted to deal with all the subject matters that can be arbitrated under 
the Arbitration Law, this provision should be changed to be parallel to the provision in the New 
York Convention to avoid unnecessary conflicts.   
Fifth, under the Civil Procedure Law, if a losing party can prove that an arbitral award 
falls one or more grounds provided by Article 260, the court where the enforcement is sought 
shall refuse to enforce the award.211 However, under the New York Convention, the court may 
have the freedom to decide whether to enforce the award under the same circumstance.212 The 
difference between “shall” and “may” shows that in China, the freedom of a court to decide 
whether to enforce an award under minor procedural irregularity is forbidden by law. The 
provisions of the Civil Procedure Law are relatively stable while the extent to which the court 
can oversee foreign-related arbitration is still extensive.213 This difference also shows that China 
is not as willing as other states parties to the New York Convention to encourage the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards. With China becoming more open to the external world, 
China should take a more positive attitude toward foreign-related arbitration and should change 
its provisions to be more consistent with international standards. 
Since the Arbitration Law does not directly provide the grounds on which the 
enforcement of a foreign-related arbitral award should be refused, it only relies on the literal 
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provisions of the Civil Procedure Law.214 However, the Arbitration Law does not refer to Part II 
of Article 260 of the Civil Procedure Law that provides social or public interest as a ground to 
refuse enforcement.215 This creates an inconsistency between the Arbitration Law and the Civil 
Procedure Law, which will result in a misunderstanding based on the interpretation of Article 
260 of the Civil Procedure Law. This is critical and should be corrected as soon as possible. 
III. Defects in the Recognition and Enforcement of Chinese Foreign-Related Arbitral 
Awards and Suggestions 
For parties seeking to protect their legal rights through arbitration in China, obtaining a 
reasonable arbitration award is only the first step in a long and precarious process. Statistics from 
the Secretariat of CIETAC indicate that among all the awards rendered by CIETAC, fewer than 
five percent went to the courts for enforcement, and among them less than eight percent were 
denied enforcement. 216 However, recent information shows an increasing number of 
applications for enforcement of CIETAC awards in the Chinese courts while the courts enforce 
only about two-thirds of the awards brought before them.217 Some foreign writers criticized the 
defects in the enforcement of arbitration awards as “legendary for victorious parties seeking to 
enforce awards in China.”218 Others claim that “China’s spotty record in honoring international 
arbitration awards even constitute one of the reasons cited for the delay in China’s admittance to 
the World Trade Organization.”219 This paper will examine these defects, introduce the efforts 
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made by Chinese legal authorities, discuss the regulations and practices in other countries such 
as the US, and try to find ways to minimize these defects. 
i. Defects Caused by the Exclusive Right of Courts to Order Interim Measures  
During the lengthy arbitration process, the disputants still run a risk that property 
available to fulfill an award will disappear, leaving nothing for the wining party to claim.220 
While the 1991 Civil Procedure Law clearly provides for emergency protection of property,221 
the 1995 Arbitration Law says that only court has the right to order interim measures to protect 
property 222or evidence223. However, in practice, a court may delay to order any party to take 
such interim measure. Furthermore, the Civil Procedure Law requires that arbitration commence 
prior to the request of interim measures, so the other party may be aware of the pending 
arbitration and have a chance to dispose of property that could otherwise satisfy an award or to 
destroy the evidence.224 Besides, courts will deny such requests absent appropriate security 
provided by the claimant. 225 So the party must put additional assets at risk to protect the assets 
already in dispute. According to statistics by the CIETAC, in about thirty percent of CIETAC’s 
arbitration cases, parties seek property preservation. Thus this provision heavily influences the 
ability of Chinese arbitration to function effectively. 
On the other hand, in the U.S., interim measures involve not only emergency property 
and evidence protection, but also continue performance under the contract during the arbitration, 
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the inspection of goods, etc.226 Although there is no clear provision stating who has the right to 
order interim measures under the FAA, in practice this order can be issued by a court upon the 
application by a party or by the arbitration tribunal while being enforced by a court.227 
Furthermore, according to the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA), a court has the right to 
order interim measures before the arbitrators are appointed by the parties, and after the 
arbitrators are appointed, both the arbitrators and the court have the right to order interim 
measures.228  The order of interim measures can be issued prior to or during the arbitration by 
either the arbitrator or the court. By giving such support for the availability of interim measures, 
arbitration awards in the U.S. can be effectively enforced.  
Furthermore, this practice in the U.S. has also been provided by the UNCITRAL Model 
Law.229 Interim measures are essential to the enforceability of final arbitration awards and since 
they are only temporary, they will not influence the final result of arbitration.230 Also, if 
necessary, the arbitration tribunal may require the petition party to provide appropriate security 
of the asset. So it is strongly suggested that Chinese arbitration tribunals should also have this 
right to order interim measures.231  
ii. Problems Caused by the Vague Definition of “Social or Public Interest.” 
The Civil Procedure Law uses social or public interest as a ground for non-enforcement 
instead of public policy under the New York Convention.232 The Civil Procedure Law provides 
that when a court holds that enforcement is contrary to Chinese social or public interest, it should 
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not enforce the award. However, there is no clear definition of social or public interest.233 In the 
early stage of the enforcement of the Civil Procedure Law and the 1995 Arbitration Law some 
courts interpreted local economic interest as a social interest thus refused to enforce the award.234 
For example, in Dongfeng Garments Factory of Kai Feng City & Tai Chun International Trade 
(Hong Kong) Co. Ltd. V. Henan Garments Import & Export (Group) Co.,235 the dispute arose 
from a joint venture establishment contract among three parties for the manufacture and export 
of fashion garments. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant breached the joint venture contract 
and applied to CIETAC to solve the dispute pursuant to the arbitration clause in the contract. The 
arbitration tribunal rendered the award for the plaintiff. While the defendant refused to enforce 
the award, the plaintiffs applied to a local Intermediate People’s Court for enforcement. 
However, a few months later, the local Intermediate People’s Court refused to enforce the 
arbitration award only because “according to current State policies and regulations, enforcement 
… would seriously harm the economic influence of the State and public interest of the society, 
and adversely affect the foreign trade order of the State.”236 Thus, social or public interest may 
be used as an excuse to refuse enforcing an award in order to protect local economic interest. 
Fortunately, the Supreme Court found this incorrect interpretation of social or public policy and 
ordered the enforcement later.237  
Since this case, no such record on the mistaken use of social or public interest has been 
found in China, because Chinese courts now give a much narrow interpretation of social or 
public interest.238 Still since there is no official legal and appropriate interpretation of social or 
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public interest in China, courts may encounter problems when interpreting this term. For 
example, a company whose place of business is in the mainland of China once imported some 
goods from a company in Hong Kong.239 Later they had a dispute about the quality of the goods 
and solved the dispute by arbitration. Since the arbitral award favored the Mainland company 
and the Hong Kong company refused to honor the award, the Mainland company sought 
enforcement of the award by an intermediate court in an area where the Hong Kong company 
had property. The Hong Kong company requested the court to refuse the enforcement because of 
the Mainland company’s misconduct when it reported the tariff tax. It argued that enforcement of 
this award meant that the Chinese court agreed with the misconduct which would conflict with 
the social or public interest of China. The intermediate court decided not to enforce the award; it 
then reported it to the local high court which affirmed the decision and reported it to the Supreme 
Court. Finally, the Supreme Court held that although the Mainland company committed 
misconduct, the enforcement of the award did not conflict with the social or public interest and 
the award was enforced.240 
Due to this ambiguity a precise interpretation of social or public interest is urgently 
needed in China. Some scholars suggest that such interests should “certainly include those 
embodied in the Constitution, which defines the basic system and basic tasks of the state,”241 but 
the short-term political policy should not be interpreted as social or public interests.242 Under the 
arrangement on the enforcement of arbitral awards between the Mainland and Hong Kong, social 
or public interest is explicitly regarded as having the same meaning as public policy.243 
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Furthermore, this arrangement requires Chinese courts to apply this ground very narrowly and 
cautiously.244  
The New York Convention does not have a clear definition of “public policy” either. But 
the practice in the U.S. and other countries may give us some clues that will be discussed later.245 
iii. Difficulty of Enforcement Because of the Bifurcated System of Arbitration in China 
 In China, domestic arbitration, i.e., arbitration proceeded by a Chinese arbitration 
tribunal, is actually divided into domestic and foreign-related arbitration, as different provisions 
govern.246 Unlike foreign-related arbitration, domestic arbitration remains intimately dependent 
on domestic courts and the national legal system.247 For example, parties of domestic arbitration 
can appeal to higher-courts to nullify an arbitration award within six months after the receipt of 
the award.248 The court shall nullify the award if: (1) there is no arbitration agreement between 
the parties; (2) the dispute is inarbitrable, or the award is beyond the scope of the arbitration 
agreement; (3) the procedure of arbitration does not follow the provisions of the Arbitration Law; 
(4) the evidence that the arbitration award rely on is forged; (5) one party suppresses evidence 
that is sufficient to influence the arbitration award; or (6) the arbitrator is corrupt. Besides, if the 
enforcement of an arbitration award is contrary to social or public interest, courts can set aside 
the award without appeal.249 It’s clear that Chinese courts will oversee both the procedural and 
the substantive merits of domestic arbitration awards in an effort to annul awards. When a court 
nullifies an award, it will ask the arbitration tribunal to re-hear the case.250 Overseeing by the 
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courts can also be made during the enforcement of arbitration awards.251 While the enforcement 
of foreign-related arbitral awards will only rely on an examination on procedural irregularities 
during the arbitration process.252 Consequently, the enforcement of domestic arbitral awards is 
more difficult than the enforcement of foreign-related ones. 
However, there is no clear definition of “foreign-related arbitration,” so it can only be 
inferred from the interpretation of what constitutes “foreign-related” civil cases. An arbitration is 
foreign-related if the arbitration involves a dispute in which (1) one or both of the parties is/are 
non-citizen of China, foreign companies or organizations; (2) the legal facts that lead to the 
establishment, modification or termination of the legal relationship between the parties occur in a 
foreign country; or (3) the subject of the action lies beyond China. 253 In practice, this ambiguity 
causes certain arbitral awards to be enforced in a more complex process. For example, Joint 
ventures, one kind of foreign-investment enterprises, are defined as Chinese legal persons under 
the Chinese Joint Venture Law,254 thus disputes related to joint ventures are deemed “domestic” 
disputes so enforcement of such awards will be more difficult than foreign-related ones. For 
example, China Int’l Construction and Consultant Corp. (Construction Corp.) sued Beijing Li Du 
Hotel Co. (Li Du)255 under their designing contract, because the plaintiff fulfilled its obligations 
with respect to the design which was the part of the contract but the defendant refused to pay. 
The plaintiff applied to CIETAC and obtained an award in its favor. Later, the plaintiff applied to 
Beijing Intermediate People’s Court to enforce the award as the defendant refused to pay. The 
defendant claimed that the award should be nullified because both parties were Chinese legal 
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persons, thus CIETAC had no power to arbitrate domestic dispute between two Chinese legal 
persons according to its 1988 Arbitration Rules. The Court agreed with the defendant’s argument 
and held that since the two parties of the dispute were Chinese legal persons, the dispute between 
them contained no foreign elements and should not be arbitrated by CIETAC. The court then 
denied enforcement of the award because CIETAC had no jurisdiction on domestic disputes at 
that time.256  
In 1998, the Chinese Congress authorized CIETAC to enlarge its jurisdiction scope to 
include disputes between foreign investment enterprises or between a foreign investment 
enterprise and a Chinese legal person, physical person and/or economic organization as well as 
domestic disputes under the 1998 Arbitration Rules of CIETAC.257 This meant that now disputes 
involving joint ventures could be arbitrated by CIETAC. However, there is still no clear decision 
on whether arbitration awards involving joint ventures are foreign-related or domestic. 
Furthermore, under the Supreme People’s Court’s Decisions on Several Questions on the 
Enforcement of Civil Procedure Law of 1991, an arbitral award involving joint ventures is 
qualified as a domestic award,258 while under the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC, such award is 
foreign-related.259 According to legal principle, the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC is only a 
private rule, so the Supreme Court’s Decisions prevails.  
In China, joint ventures are common. Such an interpretation of “foreign-related” makes 
the enforcement of arbitral awards involving joint ventures even more difficult than the 
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enforcement of foreign-related arbitral awards involving other kinds of foreign investments,260 
leading to different treatment to similar foreign investors.  
Under the current arbitration law, Chinese courts can oversee both the procedural and 
substantive merits of domestic arbitration awards in deciding whether to annul or enforce the 
awards.261 Such regulations in effect bring arbitration under the control of Chinese judicial 
system, a practice that greatly weakens the independence of domestic arbitration in China. 
Besides, the term “foreign-related” is probably only used in China. Most other countries divide 
arbitration into domestic and international categories.262 For example, an arbitral award rendered 
by a domestic arbitration commission involving at least one foreign party is considered to be a 
foreign-related arbitration award in China. While in the U.S. such an award is an international 
arbitral award enforced under international conventions.263 The arbitration law in Germany 
applies the same rules to both domestic and international arbitration as the “two-track” approach 
is seen as “outdated, and, in effect, allowed jurisdictions to endorse arbitration less than whole-
heartedly.”264 Parties seek to settle their disputes by arbitration because they want to be treated 
evenly and arbitration is supposed to provide this equality. If domestic and foreign-related 
arbitration continues to be treated differently, this means that China will follow the same path, 
thus arbitration in China not being as attractive as in other countries. 
To facilitate the healthy development of arbitration in China, there should be no 
difference between domestic and foreign-related arbitration. Since arbitration, in nature, is a 
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method to independently resolving disputes,265 courts in China should only oversee the 
procedural merits of domestic arbitration awards, thus giving more independence to domestic 
arbitration.266  
iv. Other Defects in the Practice of Law in China Lead to the Problems  
Although Chinese courts cannot legally interfere with the substantive content of foreign-
related arbitration awards, valid arbitration awards may not be enforced due to other reasons. 
First, the requirement that a foreign party apply for the enforcement of arbitral awards to the 
Intermediate People’s Court where the losing party is domiciled or has property may cause local 
protectionism.267 Since the concept of supremacy of law has not been fully applied in China, 
unlike other developed countries, the Chinese legal system appears to be not fully 
independent.268 Consequently, local Communist Party and government are unwilling to let local 
money transfer to foreigners because the tax is a source of local income, thus they may interfere 
with litigation and prevent the enforcement of awards.269  
Many foreign investors and lawyers have criticized the prevalence of local protectionism 
in China.270 In 1992, China’s central authorities first openly acknowledged the problem of local 
protectionism,271 which mainly refers to the influence of the Communist Party and local 
government over judges272 Although the systemic protections in local courts have been slow to 
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emerge,273 arbitration awards sometimes are denied enforcement because local courts come 
under significant pressure from local government authorities.274 In other cases, even if 
enforcement is not expressly denied, the practical effect is the same because the courts fail to 
fully or actively enforce the award.275 Even when courts issue orders requiring enforcement of 
arbitration awards, such orders are only pieces of paper that encounter the non-cooperation of 
other organization or government institutes that is necessary to enforce arbitration awards.276  
Second, the enforcement of arbitration awards is prevented because enforcement divisions 
within courts are inefficient due to a lack of resources, staff,277 and to under-funding.278 
Additionally, Chinese judicial staffs in some undeveloped areas are not familiar with special 
regulations on foreign-related arbitration or they may choose to ignore provisions related to 
enforcement of foreign-related arbitral awards.279 Finally, corruption is another reason why there 
are many problems in the practical enforcement of arbitral awards.280  
Fortunately, government authorities have noticed these defects. In the Work Report 
delivered at the National Conference on Politics and Law held in 1992, the Supreme People’s 
Court Justice Ren Jianxin advocated “five prohibitions” to counter local protectionism which 
include: “ (1) prohibiting local party cadres from interfering with the judicial process in an 
attempt to protect local interests; (2) prohibiting government officials and other parties from 
making threats or launching campaigns against judicial officers carrying out the execution of 
court orders; (3) prohibiting judicial organs from practicing favoritism towards local parties by 
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making unfair rulings or avoiding their proper responsibilities; (4) prohibiting officials of the 
public security and procuratorial organs from interfering with the adjudication of economic cases 
by treating contract and debt disputes as offences; and (5) prohibiting any organ or individual 
from obstructing the execution orders of the People’s Courts in any other way.” 281 
Furthermore, being aware that the problems of enforcing arbitration awards partly result 
from a lack of guidance from the Chinese government, the Supreme People’s Court has tried to 
provide this needed guidance.282 In the Notice of August 28, 1995, the Supreme Court ordered 
lower courts not to deal with disputes involving an arbitration agreement without the approval of 
a higher-level court and the Supreme Court as well as lower courts not to overturn independent 
arbitration awards without the approval of a higher-level court.283 Although this Notice will not 
solve all problems concerning the enforcement of foreign-related arbitration award, it may 
provide prevailing parties a chance at success by partially insulating enforcement decisions 
against extreme local pressures within the lower courts. Furthermore, the Notice indicates that 
national oversight is necessary in the enforcement of foreign-related arbitration awards. Before a 
people’s court issues an order not to enforce a foreign-related arbitration award, it must report to 
a local high people’s court and if this high court agrees with the non-enforcement, it should 
report to the Supreme Court.284 Only after the Supreme Court agrees to deny enforcement can 
such order be issued. This Notice shows the willingness of the Chinese judicial system to 
guarantee the enforcement of foreign-related arbitration awards, but still China should make no 
distinction between foreign-related and domestic arbitration awards.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN COMMERCIAL ARBITRAL 
AWARDS IN CHINA 
A foreign arbitration award means an arbitral award rendered by an arbitration commission 
located outside the territory of China.285 Unlike the enforcement of Chinese arbitral awards that 
is regulated by Chinese domestic law, the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards should follow 
the 1991 Civil Procedure Law and any valid international treaties between China and the country 
where the arbitral award is sought to be enforced.286  
The New York Convention is currently the most important convention addressing the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.287 China signed the New York 
Convention on December 2, 1986 and acceded to it on April 22, 1987.288 Even though foreign 
arbitral awards can be recognized and enforced in China, Chinese arbitral awards can also be 
enforced in foreign countries under the New York Convention.289 China has also acceded to the 
ISCID Convention on February 6, 1993, which has its own system for enforcing foreign arbitral 
awards.290  
According to Arbitration Research Institute of Chinese Chamber of Commerce, from 1990 
through August 1997, only fifteen foreign arbitration awards sought enforcement by Chinese 
people’s courts,291 ten of which were ordered to be enforced and four were denied enforcement. 
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Among these four awards, two were denied enforcement without reasons while the other two 
were denied enforcement because of the non-existence of the other party or the property.292 The 
rate of non-enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is 13.33%. Only two out of fifteen foreign 
awards were denied enforcement.293 
A. Enforcement under Domestic Law 
The party seeking enforcement of a foreign arbitration award should file an application for 
enforcement to the Intermediate Court of the place where the losing party resides or has property 
that is the subject of the award.294 The competent Chinese court will deal with the application for 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award according to the New York Convention or any other 
international conventions.295 Under the Supreme People’s Court’s regulation on fees and time 
limit for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards,296 a competent court should 
decide whether to recognize and enforce an award within two months from the date of receiving 
the application and normally should finish the enforcement within six months from the date of 
deciding to enforce the award.297 Fees for enforcement are determined after fees schedule of 
courts.298 If the competent Intermediate Court decides not to recognize and enforce the foreign 
award, it should report to the Supreme People’s Court within two months from the date of 
receiving the application, and the Supreme People’s Court has final right to decide whether to 
enforce the award. 299 
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B. Enforcement under the New York Convention  
The New York Convention became part of Chinese law in 1987 and a number of foreign 
arbitral awards made in other member states have been granted recognition and enforcement in 
China under the Convention.300  
I. Sphere of Application of the New York Convention 
Under Article I of the New York Convention, arbitration awards involving both 
commercial and noncommercial disputes are enforceable in a contracting or a non-contracting 
country.301 Consequently, the New York Convention “confers legitimacy upon awards granted in 
any state, whether or not a contracting state, and whether or not the parties are subject to the 
jurisdiction of different contracting states.”302 However, Article I (3) of the New York 
Convention permits member states to declare the reciprocity reservation303 and the commercial 
reservation.304 China made these two reservations to its membership.305 For countries who make 
two reservations such as China, the requirements for the application of the New York 
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Convention include: (1) a written arbitration agreement between the two parties;306 (2) the 
arbitration award is rendered in a contracting state, or the award is not domestic;307 and (3) the 
award involves a legal and commercial relationship between the parties.308 
 The New York Convention applies to foreign awards and non-domestic ones. In other 
words, the New York Convention applies to awards made in the territory of a state other than the 
state in which the recognition and enforcement of the award is sought, as well as to “arbitral 
awards not considered as domestic awards in the state where the recognition and enforcement are 
sought.”309 However, the New York Convention does not provide the definition of the key term 
“domestic awards.” This weakness has led to nonconformity between the contracting states in 
their application of the New York Convention.310  
The United States considers a relationship “international” to be treated under the New 
York Convention if the relationship is not entirely between citizens of the United State and even 
so, or if there is some “reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.”311 For example, in 
Sigval Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp.,312 the United States court interpreted “not considered as 
domestic” under the New York Convention as arbitration awards that were rendered “within the 
legal framework of another country,”313 and the U.S. court enforced a domestically rendered 
arbitral award between two foreign entities under the New York Convention.314  The U.S. court 
also held that the New York Convention can be applied to a domestically promulgated arbitration 
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award between two United States citizens if the dispute arose out of an agreement or contract 
involving performance in another country.315 For example, in Lander Co., Inc. v. MMP 
Investments, Inc.,316 both parties were domestic while the plaintiff sought enforcement of a 
domestically rendered arbitral award with respect to a contract for distribution in Poland of the 
plaintiff’s products.317 The Seventh Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals held that provisions of 
the New York Convention do not exclude its application within a contracting state.318 
Furthermore, this dispute also involved performance of a contract abroad.319 The Seventh Circuit 
court decided the applicability of the New York Convention to this domestically rendered 
arbitral award.320 Therefore, a U.S. court will decide whether an arbitral award should be 
enforced under the New York Convention on the basis of the nationality of the award, the 
nationality of the parties to the disputes, or the substantive factors of the dispute. 
 However, the rules in England on the application of the New York Convention are 
different from those in the U.S.. In England, an arbitral award can be enforced under the New 
York Convention if: (1) the award is arbitrated outside England, i.e., foreign arbitration award; or 
(2) the award is arbitrated in England but at least one party of the dispute is not an English 
person.321 The English courts will decide the application of the New York Convention on the 
basis of the nationality of the arbitral award or the parties to the disputes.  
However, in China, the Civil Procedure Law regulates that the New York Convention can 
only be applied to arbitral awards rendered by foreign arbitration commissions, i.e., foreign 
                                                 
315 107 F. 3d 476 (7th Cir. 1997), 483. 
316 Id. 
317 Id, at 481. 
318 Id.  
319 Id. at 482. 
320 Id, at 483. 
321 Jia Fei, New York Convention: its Future—Suggestion on the Rectification of New York Convention, Arb. & L., 
10, 18 (2000 (5)). 
  47
arbitral awards.322 Furthermore, a Supreme People’s Notice on the Enforcement of the New York 
Convention323 explicitly provides that the New York Convention can only be applied to 
international commercial arbitral awards rendered by a foreign arbitration commission in another 
contracting state, called “foreign commercial arbitral awards.”324  Therefore, a Chinese court will 
disregard the provision on “not considered as domestic awards” in the New York Convention325, 
and consider such award as a Chinese foreign-related arbitral award or even a Chinese domestic 
award to be enforced under Chinese domestic law. For example, if Lander Co., Inc. v. MMP 
Investments, Inc. happened in China, the court would consider it a domestic arbitral award and 
enforce it under Chinese domestic law.326 In China, a court will decide whether to enforce an 
arbitral award under the New York Convention only on the basis of the nationality of the award, 
thus greatly limiting the scope of the application of the New York Convention. Since in China 
enforcement of an arbitral award under the New York Convention is relatively easier than that 
under Chinese domestic law, some parties will complain about the limited scope of the 
application of the New York Convention in China.  
Furthermore, although the New York Convention does not clearly define “non-domestic” 
arbitration awards, the UNCITRAL Model Law states that arbitration is international and should 
be enforced under international conventions if: (1) the parties, at the time of conclusion of the 
arbitration agreement, had their places of business in different states; (2) the place of arbitration 
is situated outside the state where both parties have their place of business; (3) any place where a 
substantial part of the obligations is to be performed, or the place with which the subject-matter 
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of dispute is closely connected, is situated outside the state where the parties have their place of 
business; or (4) both parties expressly agree that the subject matter of the arbitration agreement 
involves more than one country.327 According to this interpretation, most Chinese foreign-related 
arbitral awards, and even some domestic arbitral awards, should be treated as “international” and 
enforced under the New York Convention or another international convention.328 
Therefore, to make China more attractive for foreign investors, aside from giving 
domestic arbitration more independence by simply overseeing the procedural merits of domestic 
arbitral awards, China should broaden the sphere of application of the New York Convention. If 
China follows the lead of many other countries and divides arbitration into domestic and 
international categories while requiring all international arbitration to be regulated by 
international conventions, Chinese arbitration will develop more quickly and more in line with 
recognized international standards. 
II. Prerequisite on Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards in China 
Under the New York Convention, when a losing party refuses to enforce the international 
arbitral award, the successful party may apply to a contracting state where the losing party 
resides or has property.329 The successful party only needs to present an original or certified copy 
of the arbitral award and agreement to a court of that contracting state.330  In China, a petitioning 
party should also submit its identification certificate and a written application form in Chinese.331 
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III. Enforcement Procedure of International Arbitral Awards under the New York 
Convention 
Under Article III of the New York Convention, a contracting state court will enforce an 
arbitral award according to the rules of its domestic procedure laws.332 Although a few countries 
favor international arbitral awards and allow enforcement without the official justification of a 
domestic court, most countries enforce an award only after a local court has given permission to 
execute the award by public force.333 However, the procedures and the extent of examination 
exercised by domestic courts over international awards in enforcement proceedings vary among 
countries.334 For example, in England, courts will follow the same procedure for the enforcement 
of both domestic and international arbitral awards, either “by a cause of action on the award or 
by an application under section 26 of the 1950 Act.”335 To provide a competitive environment for 
foreign investment, the United States has been a strong supporter of international arbitration. The 
U.S. acceded to the New York Convention on December 29, 1970 336 and consistently upholds 
the enforcement of international awards under this Convention, demonstrating a “pro-
enforcement bias”337 by taking an “increasingly internationalist approach.”338 Chapter 2 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) implements the New York Convention and makes international 
arbitral awards involving commercial matters enforceable in the United States.339 Chapter 2 of 
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the FAA limits federal district courts to recognize and enforce only commercial arbitral 
agreements or awards.340 Under the United States Arbitration Act (USAA), any party to an 
arbitration award can apply to a specified court for an order confirming the award, and once the 
award is confirmed, that party can enforce it as it is just like a judgment of the court.341 
The same procedure happens in China. After receiving the written application for 
enforcement, the competent intermediate court will determine whether to confirm the validity of 
the final award.342 If there is no ground to refuse the enforcement, the court will issue the 
enforcement order.343 For example, in Food Industries’ Planning & Servicing Ltd. (Switzerland) 
(hereinafter Food Industries) v. China Hua Yang Technology and Trade Corporation (China) 
(hereinafter Hua Yang),344 a dispute arose between the two parties regarding a turkey contract for 
a lack current berries juice processing plant. The case was arbitrated at the Arbitration Institute 
of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce according to the arbitration clause in the contract. On 
April 10, 1995, an award was issued in favor of Food Industries that required Hua Yang to pay a 
certain amount of Swiss Francs and Hong Kong Dollars.345 However, Hua Yang did not perform 
the award, so Food Industry applied for enforcement to the Beijing First Intermediate People’s 
Court under the 1995 China Arbitration Law.346 Hua Yang argued that the court should refuse to 
enforce the award because it violated Article V of the New York Convention.347 After carefully 
examining Hua Yang’s arguments and evidence, the court held that the award did not “fall under 
the situations where recognition and enforcement may be refused as described in Art. V (1) and 
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(2) of the New York Convention nor does it violate the reservations declared by China at the 
time of its accession to the Convention.”348 The court finally ordered that “the validity of the 
final award made … by the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce … is 
confirmed” and shall be enforced.349 From this case, we can see that as in the United States, 
foreign arbitral awards that seek enforcement in China also must be confirmed first.  
C. Refusal to Recognize and Enforce Foreign Arbitration Awards under the New York 
Convention and Common Puzzles 
A court in China will refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award only on the limited seven 
grounds noted in Article V of the New York Convention and two other Chinese reservations.350 
All seven grounds can be divided into two groups: one “related to the parties and the arbitration 
agreement” and the other “related to the matter under arbitration.”351 The losing party who 
objects to the enforcement has the burden of proving that the award should not be enforced.352 
However, among these seven grounds, two grounds are quite complex and are discussed in detail 
in this paper. 
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I. Refusal to Enforce Because the Award was not Binding or Was Set Aside in the Country 
Rendered.353  
Under this ground, the country where the enforcement is sought must look into the laws 
of the country where the arbitration award was rendered to determine whether the arbitration 
award is binding, thus enforceable under the New York Convention.354 However, to decide when 
an award is binding can be complex under different circumstances. For example, in Europcar 
Italia, S.p. A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc.,355 the parties agreed to have their dispute arbitrated in 
Italy under an informal arbitration procedure known as “arbitrato irrituale in equita” (arbitrato 
irrituale).356 Germany’s Supreme Court held that awards rendered under arbitrato irrituale are not 
enforceable under the New York Convention, while the Italian Supreme Court held that because 
such award is binding on the parties, an award rendered under arbitrato irritule can be enforced 
under the New York Convention.357 The Second Circuit of U.S. District Court disregarded the 
enforceability of an award under arbitrato irrituale under the New York Convention, but looked 
into parties’ free will.358 The U.S. Court held that because the parties had explicitly agreed to 
resolve their dispute by arbitration and to be bound by the arbitration award,359 the award should 
be binding and enforceable under the New York Convention.360 
Another issue arising in this context is even if the award is set aside or not binding in the 
country where the award is rendered, should the contracting state refuse to enforce the award? 
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The answer is probably “no” in some contracting states. The rationale of this answer is based on 
Article V (1) (e) which provides that a court “may” refuse to enforce an award under the ground, 
giving the contracting state court where enforcement is sought the right to choose whether or not 
to enforce the award.361 A U.S. court may make such a decision on the basis of whether the 
arbitration agreement provides that the arbitration decision will be subject to any appeal or other 
recourse, as well as other factors.362 
For example, in the famous case of Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypy 
case,363 the U.S. court found that an arbitration award, rendered in Egypt in favor of an American 
corporation (against the Egyptian Air Force), was nullified by the Egyptian Court under Egyptian 
law, a situation falling within Article V (1)(e) of the New York Convention.364 Since Article V of 
the New York Convention provides that a court “may” refuse to enforce under certain 
circumstances, the term “may” means that the courts have a certain right of self-determination on 
the issue of enforcement.365 The U.S. court left Article V (1)(e) aside and looked into Article VII 
(1) which provides that any winning party of an arbitration award may protect his interest 
afforded by the award to the extent “allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such 
award is sought to be relied upon.”366 The U.S. court held that it should give the American 
corporation all rights afforded under domestic arbitration law and looked into FAA.367 Under § 
10 of FAA, an arbitration award can be set aside or nullified only in limited circumstances.368 
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After analyzing the Egyptian arbitration proceedings under § 10 of Domestic FAA, the U.S. 
court concluded that the award should not be nullified.369  
Furthermore, the U.S. court relied on a principle in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.370 that 
parochial views should not be allowed to undermine the enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement.371 It also relied on the clause that the parties of this dispute had explicitly agreed that 
the arbitration would be final and binding and not subject to appeal.372 The U.S. court did not 
apply Egyptian law, the law chosen by the parties, to judge the validity of this clause,373 nor did 
it apply the principle that such clauses do not influence the grounds for vacating arbitral 
awards.374 In effect, this court disregarded Article V (1)(e) of the New York Convention, which 
suggests the court where the enforcement is sought to take into account the decision of the local 
court where the award is rendered when deciding whether to enforce the award.375 In the end, the 
arbitral award was confirmed while the local Egyptian court’s willing was disregarded376 
Contrary to Chromalloy case, in Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd.,377 the 
Nigerian Federal High Court nullified two arbitration awards rendered in Nigeria under Nigerian 
law on several grounds.378 The Nigerian plaintiffs applied to a U.S. court for the enforcement of 
the invalid awards.379 Both the Second Circuit and the District Court refused to confirm the 
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arbitral awards because U.S. law should not be applied to judge the merits of the awards.380 The 
parties had agreed to arbitrate in Nigeria under Nigerian law, a situation different from 
Chromalloy that specifically provided that the arbitration decision would not be subject to any 
appeal or other recourse.381 Furthermore, unlike the court in Chromalloy case, the court in the 
Baker case found no reasons to refuse to follow the judgment of the Nigerian court.382 So in the 
U.S. a nullified arbitral award does not always mean an “unenforceable” award. A U.S. court 
where the enforcement is sought will decide whether to enforce the award after examining 
related factors such as the parties’ explicit express agreement, and the grounds on which the 
award is nullified. 
Similarly, in France, a court would not refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award just 
because it was set aside by a local court in the country where it was rendered. The 1981 French 
decree provides that the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards is the same as that of 
French international arbitral awards.383 This French statute does not allow its court to refuse to 
enforce an award only on the ground that it was set aside by the local court in the country where 
the award was rendered.384 A French court will make its own decision after examining the 
reasons for non-enforcement under its own laws.385  
At this time, there is no record in China that a Chinese court will enforce a foreign 
commercial arbitral award that has been set aside or nullified by the country where the award 
was rendered.386 Theoretically, as a contracting state of the New York Convention, a Chinese 
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court also has the right of free judgment provided by Article V of the New York Convention that 
says a court “may” refuse to recognize and enforce an arbitral award if the award falls under one 
or more of the seven grounds.387 However, the Supreme People’s Court’s Notice on the 
Enforcement of the New York Convention in China in 1987 provided that if a Chinese court 
finds that a foreign award falls under one or more of the seven grounds provided in the New 
York Convention, it should refuse to enforce the award.388 The use of “should” instead of “may” 
excludes the judge’s right to exercise free judgment, a practice that is not in line with the purpose 
of the New York Convention.389  
The New York Convention’s aim is to facilitate the enforcement of international arbitral 
awards in contracting states. Article VII of the New York Convention further provides that the 
Convention shall not “affect the validity of multilateral or bilateral agreements concerning the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards entered into by the Contracting State nor deprive 
any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner 
and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such award is sought to 
be relied upon.”390 This provision permits a contracting state to enforce a nullified arbitral award 
if under either international treaties other than the New York Convention or that state’s domestic 
law, the enforcement of such awards is permitted. As in the U.S., a nullified foreign arbitral 
award does not always mean “unenforceability”.391 Furthermore, a court will look into the 
parties’ explicit express agreement, the grounds on which the award is nullified, and other related 
factors to decide the enforceability of a foreign arbitral award. It is such practice that meets the 
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spirit of arbitration: neutrality.392 Parties prefer arbitration because it helps to free them from the 
control of local courts. Depending on a court’s decision while regardless of parties’ explicit will 
and other reasonable factors, we actually force arbitration still under local courts’ control, a 
practice that conflict with the good will of the New York Convention and the spirit of arbitration 
thus discourage the development of Chinese arbitration. With the development of Chinese 
international transactions, there will be more and more foreign arbitral awards sought to be 
enforced in China. To facilitate the enforcement of arbitral awards, thus to encourage foreign 
investments in China, the regulations in China should no longer be so rigid, but should provide 
judges with the right of free judgment to encourage the purpose behind the New York 
Convention to be a viable reality in China. 
II. Refusal to Enforce Because of Public Policy of Enforcing State.393  
When the New York Convention was initially promulgated, many countries were 
reluctant to become contracting states394 because they believed that the rules of the New York 
Convention were in conflict with the countries’ own domestic laws.395 However, the provision 
on public policy and the greater reliance by foreign investors on international arbitration have led 
many states to adopt the New York Convention.396  
However, “public policy” is not clearly defined in the New York Convention, yet it is 
most often cited by the losing party in an enforcement proceeding.397 Among the seven grounds, 
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this broad public policy ground gained the most attention398 In practice, the contracting parties 
are supposed to interpret this ground narrowly to give the New York Convention greater 
effect.399 For example, the United States used to be hostile to arbitration,400 but once it became a 
contracting state of the Convention, the U.S. federal courts strongly favored arbitration as a 
method to settle disputes involving international commerce.401 The United States courts “have 
been careful to take into account the strong public policy favoring arbitration and to adopt 
standards and define defenses in a manner that can be uniformly applied on an international 
scale. They have therefore construed narrowly any defenses to the enforcement or recognition of 
an award.”402 In fact, the U.S. courts have rarely refused to enforce a foreign arbitration award on 
a public policy ground.403 For example, federal courts will not refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral 
award even if the award conflicts with the foreign policy of the United States, the agreement or 
award is contrary to federal or state law, or the award is barred by latches.404 In Parsons & 
Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De L’ Industrie Du Papier,405 the  U.S. court 
held that the "enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on [the public policy] basis 
only where enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic notion of morality and 
justice."406 Furthermore, in Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chems. Corp.,407 the court followed 
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a narrow interpretation of “public policy” and held that a court could refuse to enforce a foreign 
arbitral award when the enforcement would violate the most fundamental notions of justice.408 
Although the New York Convention regulates “public policy” to make it more flexible to 
attract more contracting states, currently when courts interpret “public policy,” most of them will 
disregard the formal test of whether the enforcement will violate domestic law or domestic 
principles.409 Instead, they will come to the opposite conclusion and apply the test of whether the 
enforcement would violate “international order.”410 After years of practice, China interprets 
“public policy” as “fundamental principles,” an interpretation that is much narrower than before, 
thus a Chinese court can’t refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award unless it violates “the most 
fundamental morals and principles of the Chinese system,”411 however, such interpretation still 
falls behind the just mentioned interpretation -- “international order.” 
III. Other Problems in the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards  
The New York Convention was intended to facilitate enforcement of international arbitral 
awards throughout the world. However, as with many legal issues in the early stages in China, 
consistent application of existing legal principles was a problem, including enforcement of 
arbitral awards.412 Although Chinese courts are permitted to refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral 
award only in accordance with Article V of the New York Convention, Chinese courts may do so 
without justification.413 When one looks at published and unpublished record on the enforcement 
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of foreign arbitral awards, China’s early performance was not consistent and not satisfactory.414 
One famous example of poor enforcement in China is Revpower case.415 Revpower, a U.S. 
manufacturer of industrial batteries, and its Chinese joint venture partner had their dispute 
arbitrated in Stockholm.416 The arbitral award issued in 1993 favored Revpower in the sum of 
approximately $5 million U.S. dollars. In the same year, Revpower applied to enforce the award 
with the Shanghai Intermediate People's Court, but it took two years for Revpower to 
successfully register the award with this court.417 Despite registration and subsequent diplomatic 
pressures, the Shanghai People's Court refused to enforce the award without giving any 
reasonable grounds for its refusal.418 This court finally dismissed Revpower's application on the 
ground that the losing party had filed for bankruptcy and therefore there were no assets against 
which the award could be enforced.419  
Chinese legal authorities became aware of their bad reputation on the enforcement of 
foreign arbitration awards. So in 1995 the Supreme People’s Court issued a Notice on how to 
deal with foreign arbitral awards which regulates that a final decision to refuse to enforce a 
foreign arbitral award can only be made by the Supreme Court.420  Furthermore, to guarantee 
effective enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, in 1998 the Supreme People’s Court issued a 
regulation imposing a time limit on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, giving a 
competent court two months from the date of receiving the application to decide whether to 
recognize and enforce an award and six months from the date of their previous decision to finish 
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the enforcement. 421 And although there have been some problems in non-major cities, such as a 
general lack of resources, expertise, and knowledge of the New York Convention among 
Chinese judicial officials and remnants of local protectionism,422 with the development of the 
economy, China has made great strides in disseminating an elementary knowledge of law 
including international law to all officials. The Chinese government has realized that a good 
reputation on following international law will attract more foreign investors to invest in China.423 
And after China became a member of the World Trade Organization, with the development of 
even more transparent market, the legal circumstance will become even better. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ENFORCEMENT OF CHINESE ARBITRAL AWARDS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
According to the 1995 Arbitration Law, if one party of a domestic foreign-related arbitral 
award is a Chinese legal person, while the other party or its property is located outside the 
territory of China, the Chinese party should apply for the enforcement of the award to a 
competent foreign court.424 Since China acceded to the New York Convention in 1987, the 
recognition and enforcement of Chinese arbitration awards is mainly achieved under the New 
York Convention.425 Now, Chinese arbitral awards can be recognized and enforced in more than 
90 countries426 and over seventy cases have been successfully recognized and enforced in over 
20 countries around the world, including the United States, England, Canada, Japan, German and 
Australia.427 The winning party who applies for the enforcement of the arbitral award in another 
country must provide a duly authenticated original award or its duly certified copy, as well the 
original arbitration agreement or its duly certified copy.428 The foreign court should enforce the 
arbitral award unless the losing party or the court can prove the existence of at least one of the 
five grounds on which enforcement may be denied under Article V of the New York 
Convention.429  
Most Chinese arbitration awards that are enforced in foreign countries are CIETAC 
awards.430 However, different countries may interpret the New York Convention and decide 
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whether to enforce CIETAC awards in different ways. I will first look at the enforcement of two 
CIETAC awards in the United States. First, in Polytek Engineering Co.(a Hong Kong Co.) v. 
Jacobson Co.(a U.S. Co.),431 the plaintiff first signed a contract with a Chinese corporation 
agreeing to sell certain equipment to that Chinese corporation.432 Since the plaintiff did not 
produce the equipment, it sent a purchase order to the defendant, a Minnesota corporation 
pursuant to the original contract.433 The plaintiff attached to the purchase order the contract with 
the Chinese corporation, which included an arbitration clause stating that any disputes arising 
from the contract should be solved by arbitration in CIETAC.434 The plaintiff also included on 
the purchase order a clause saying “all the terms and conditions should conform to the main 
contract attached.”435  Following the provisions of the purchase order and the attached contract, 
the defendant delivered the equipment to the plaintiff, and then the plaintiff transferred it to the 
Chinese corporation.436 However, the Chinese corporation claimed that the equipment could not 
perform as stated under the contract. The Chinese corporation and the Hong Kong corporation 
sought to solve the dispute by CIETAC.437 The arbitration award favored the Chinese 
corporation for damages of $ 1.2 million and ordered the plaintiff to collect the equipment at the 
plaintiff’s cost.438  
The plaintiff then sued the U.S. corp. in CIETAC and received an award favoring the 
plaintiff for damages of $ 1.7 million and ordered the defendant to collect the equipment at the 
defendant’s cost.439 Upon the defendant’s refusal to enforce the CIETAC award, the plaintiff 
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applied to the U.S. District Court of Minnesota to enforce the CIETAC award. The defendant 
argued that it had no arbitration agreement with the plaintiff, so it should not be bound to the 
CIETAC award.440 The court found that the key issue was whether an arbitration clause of a 
contract attached to a purchase order could meet the requirement of a written arbitration 
agreement between the parties.441 After examining the legal facts of the dispute, the court 
concluded that because the purchase order was formed after the initial contract and the 
transaction between the parties actually heavily relied on that contract, and during the transaction 
the defendant never objected to the arbitration clause, it could be deemed that there was a written 
arbitration agreement between the parties.442 Since the defendant made no further challenges 
pursuant to Article V of the New York Convention, the court ordered the enforcement of this 
CIETAC award.443  
A second case is Anhui Provincial Import & Export Corp. (Anhui) v. Hart Enterprises 
International, Inc. (Hart),444 where Anhui applied to CIETAC for Hart's breach of a series of 
purchase contracts between them.445 CIETAC received the case and notified Hart to appoint an 
arbitrator and forward its statement of the case, but Hart failed to do so.446 CIETAC then notified 
Hart of the impending arbitration proceedings in Beijing, but Hart still did not respond to the 
notification nor did it attend the arbitration hearing.447 Instead, Hart brought suit in an American 
court that ordered Hart to solve the dispute by arbitration. However, several days before the 
order was issued, the arbitration tribunal in China had already conducted its hearing on the issue 
and the CIETAC filed an award favoring Anhui who subsequently applied to a U.S. district court 
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to enforce the award.448 Hart appealed, claiming the court must not enforce the award on the 
ground that it had lack of notice.449 The court looked into whether the enforcement of the award 
would be against public policy or whether the award rendered did lack necessary notice to 
Hart.450 The court finally held that neither the enforcement of the award would be against US 
public policy nor Hart was without notice. The court even thought that Hart had “essentially 
ignored CIETAC during every step of the arbitration process.”451 Consequently, the court 
ordered the recognition and enforcement of the award.452 
From these two cases, we can see that normally U.S. courts decide whether to recognize 
and enforce a foreign arbitral award by strictly following the rules of the New York Convention. 
Furthermore, in Polytek, although the defendant never showed a positive intent to have the 
dispute solved by arbitration, the court confirmed the existence of a written arbitration agreement 
between the parties. It is easy to conclude that U.S. courts are more likely to confirm the validity 
of arbitration awards and enforce such awards. Since the enforcement of international arbitral 
awards falls under the New York Convention, it is an even easier process to enforce such awards 
than for domestic arbitral awards.  
Chinese arbitral awards are also enforced in Japan under the New York Convention. For 
example, on August 25, 1999, a Japanese district court issued an order to recognize and enforce a 
CIETAC award involving a purchase contract between a Japanese company and a Chinese 
company.453 The two parties had their dispute solved by CIETAC according to the contract.454 
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On December 6, 1997, CIETAC rendered an award favoring the Chinese party who, after the 
losing Japanese party failed to fulfill the award within the required time, applied to a Japanese 
district court to enforce the award.455 Besides the petition of the invalidity of the arbitration 
agreement and the irregularity of the arbitration process, the Japanese party argued that the 
plaintiff provided false evidence to the arbitration tribunal. The court held that the termination of 
the contract could not deny the validity of the arbitration agreement between the parties, 
therefore the dispute should be decided by arbitration.456 Although the Japanese party used the 
fact that the arbitration tribunal notified him in Chinese instead of Japanese and did not provide a 
Chinese lawyer for him as reasons to nullify the arbitration award.457 The court found that under 
Article 75 (1) of the Arbitration Rules of CIETAC, arbitration would proceed in Chinese unless 
the parties agreed to use another language. Since the parties did not agree on the use of a 
language other than Chinese before the arbitration commenced, the fact that arbitration 
proceeded in Chinese should not be deemed as an irregularity of the arbitration process.458 
Lastly, the court looked into the petition of “false evidence” on the ground of “public policy,” 
and held that this misconduct could not be seen as a violation of “public policy” that should be 
interpreted as basic Japanese legal principles.459 This meant that the CIETAC award gained full 
enforcement in Japan.460 
The attitude of courts in Singapore regarding the enforcement of Chinese arbitral awards 
under the New York Convention is also relevant. In Hainan Machinery Import and Export 
Corporation (Hainan Co.) v. Donald & McArthy Pte Ltd. (Donald Ltd.),461 CIETAC issued an 
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arbitration award favoring Hainan Co., who applied to a Singapore court to enforce the award. 
Donald Ltd. argued to refuse to enforce the award on the basis of section 31 (2) (e) of the 
International Arbitration Act (IAA) (similar to article V (1) (d) of the New York Convention).462 
The court denied the petition because the defendant did not provide sufficient evidence to prove 
that the composition of the arbitration tribunal or the arbitration proceeding breached the 
Arbitration Rules of CIETAC.463 Instead, the court held that the defendant had sufficient 
opportunity to attend the hearing but it chose to avoid the proceeding.464 The defendant also 
argued that since the plaintiff claimed it would seek legal recourse, the plaintiff had waived its 
right to arbitrate. The court held that such claim could not legally waive the plaintiff’s right to 
arbitrate.465 The evidence provided by the defendant only showed that the defendant sincerely 
believed that by seeking legal recourse, the plaintiff meant to commence a lawsuit. The court 
denied the defendant’s petition based on this evidence. 466 The defendant also argued that the 
dispute should be determined under its applicable law. However, the parties did not agree on any 
applicable law and neither did the arbitration tribunal.467 The court held that the principle of 
applicable law is that if the parties did not have an agreement on applicable law, the law in the 
country where the arbitration commission is located would be regarded as the implied choice of 
law between the parties.468 Here, CIETAC is located in China and the tribunal rendered the 
award based on Chinese law. Thus, this too was denied by the court.469 Lastly, the defendant 
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argued that because the award did not “decide the real matter in dispute between the parties,” the 
enforcement of the award would be against public policy.470 The court discussed on what 
constituted “public policy” and held that “public policy did not require that this court refuse to 
enforce the award obtained by the plaintiffs. There was no allegation of illegality or fraud and 
enforcement would therefore not be injurious to the public good.”471 Therefore, the award was 
enforced. 
From the above cases, it is evident that Chinese arbitral awards have gained satisfactory 
enforcement since China became a contracting state of the New York Convention. Almost all the 
contracting states strictly follow the rules of the New York Convention when deciding whether 
to enforce a Chinese arbitral award. As the Singapore court said in Hainan Machinery, “as a 
nation which itself aspires to be an international arbitration center, Singapore must recognize 
foreign awards if it expects its own awards to be recognized abroad.”472 This idea should also be 
treasured by Chinese courts. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
For foreign investors, a better investment environment is very important to guarantee 
success in international business. Deference to arbitration can provide part of this guarantee even 
though foreign investors may have to resolve their disputes in other country using a foreign law 
in the arbitration process. While the Chinese government has taken significant steps towards 
meeting internationally accepted norms for conducting business and for resolving international 
commercial disputes, further changes including changes on arbitration are needed. China must 
support the recognition and enforcement of domestic and international arbitral awards if it wants 
to remain an attractive forum to foreign investors in the long term. To achieve this target, 
China’s legal authorities should rectify the outdated provisions on arbitration, continue 
disseminating legal knowledge on domestic and international arbitration, but start with forming a 
more positive attitude towards arbitration. Being a new member of the WTO, China’s heartily 
deference to arbitration will help it gain a good reputation on international trade and give foreign 
investors more confidence in Chinese free market, which will be a great contributing factor in the 
development of a healthy Chinese economy. 
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